Over the course of several days in 1997, Jacques Derrida delivered a long lecture to attendees of a conference in Cerisy called "Th e Autobiographical Animal. " As part of his opening remarks, the philosopher recounted a curious little scene that served to introduce the central theme of the larger address that followed. Th e scene begins when Derrida reports that each morning, with an almost ritualistic regularity, he is followed from his bedroom into the bathroom by his cat, an unnamed feline, he insists, that is a real little cat, not the mere figure of a cat: "It doesn't silently enter the bedroom as an allegory for all the cats on earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions" (2008, 6). Th e action picks up when Derrida finds himself naked before this little cat, naked in front of the insistent gaze of the animal, an encounter, he reports, that he always has a "bad time" (j'ai du mal) overcoming (4). Th e regular meeting never fails to flood him with shame, especially if he is caught face-to-face, if the cat observes him frontally naked, as if with a view to seeing. Th e scene comes to an end when the cat
invariably leaves the bathroom, looking for her breakfast or asking to be let out. After the presentation of this strange theme, Derrida begins to weave a remarkable set of variations, not least of which is treating the encounter as a contemporary iteration of the Biblical Fall, that first, painful moment when the human became aware of its own interiority-a coming to know oneself that means knowing oneself ashamed, in short, a consciousness of good and evil-the original primal scene, which the philosopher points out, occurred under the gaze of a rather famous Biblical animot.
1
One feels tempted to try to name Derrida's theme: Moments when the animal regards me. Th e point of view of animals. An animal looks at me.
Th e experience of the seeing animal. In the beginning, since time, since so long ago, the animal has been looking. Seeing oneself seen naked under the gaze called animal. Or perhaps simply: Th e gaze called animal. It is a slightly unsettling motif. Upon first hearing, it might sound like a coy play on one of John Berger's (1991) more familiar and comforting themes: "Why look at animals?" But in one of his characteristic deconstructive reversals, Derrida is instead attempting to glean significance from occasions when one feels seen by that which we call animal.
2
Despite the delicate playfulness of the opening scene, Derrida's long lecture quickly evolves into a fierce Sturm und Drang. Th e bathroom encounter is followed by an ambitious pronouncement about the current "epoch" of thinking on animals, an age beginning with Descartes and his animal-machines: "At bottom, " Derrida thunders, there are "only two types of discourse, two positions of knowledge, two grand forms of theoretical or philosophical treatise regarding the animal" (2008, 13) . It is, of course, the first that preoccupies him. Of this category he names a handful of philosophical giants-Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Lévinas-thinkers that have all seen, observed, analyzed, and reflected on the animal, and yet, Derrida insists, have never been seen seen. Each has failed to draw significance from those moments when the animal "looks at me": "Th ey neither wanted nor had the capacity to draw any systemic consequence from the fact that an animal could, facing them, look at them, clothed or naked, and in a word, without a word, address them" (13) . Although their philosophical discourses might be sound, Derrida pro- poses that their thinking proceeds in the form of a disavowal, as if they have
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never been regarded by someone "deep within a life called animal" (14) . Th is remarkable opening movement is followed by a series of three "micrological" readings in which Derrida puts his working hypothesis to the test. As a whole, the lecture sounds as if the philosopher were attempting to let the animals loose in the hallways of his profession.
As for that other type of discourse, that other "position of knowledge" regarding the animal, Derrida imagines it belongs to the poets and the prophets, men and women who have taken upon themselves the animal's address. But the philosopher bemoans that he has yet to find a statutory representative, someone who has the power to denude, someone who can present oneself as a theoretical, philosophical, or juridical subject capable of drawing significance from the gaze called animal. Indeed, by the end of his lecture, Derrida's long cantata in four movements, he is still searching.
Th e complexity of this work, posthumously gathered and published under the title Th e Animal Th at Th erefore I Am, surely calls for an extended analysis, an elaborate commentary with all the requisite patience. As Derrida recalls in the course of his introduction, the question of "the animal" is a recurring motif that circulates in any number of his texts. And yet the fact he returned to this topic in his last seminar (Th e Beast and the Sovereign, delivered in 2001-3) might tempt us to regard the theme as an instance of "late style, " that is, a work that bears a contradictory and perhaps even intransigent relationship to its milieu. As Th omas Mann once proposed, late style emerges at that moment when an artist's work "has overgrown itself, rising out of the habitable regions of tradition, even before the startled gaze of human eyes" (in Said 2006, 8) . Th e unique and often isolated voice that is characteristic of late style is thought to come from grappling with impending death. What might appear to be stylistic carelessness is in fact an irascible fight against that final sleep, an urgent, pressured breaking away with tradition. In this respect, one cannot help but notice Derrida's anxious instance on time, and specifically on not having enough of it: "If I had time . . . " is one of the most oft-repeated refrains of this lecture.
"An animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. " What does such an encounter set in motion? Derrida immediately off ers his answer: "Th inking perhaps begins there" (2008, 29) . I take these statements to be the crux of the philosopher's intervention. But what does it mean to place thinking under the gaze called animal? What would it mean to think through this primal scene, or indeed, for thinking to proceed from this encounter? How does such a meeting open up the logic of, or indeed, rend any traditional theory of thinking? How does Derrida's formula reorient the interminable debates about the definition of "the human?" In response to these difficult questions, the rest of this essay presents my own variations on Derrida's theme. I should immediately warn the reader, however, that what follows is nothing like the "systematic" elaboration that the philosopher calls for, but rather something more like study notes, an attempt to press his motif into yet another variation set. Specifically, Derrida's opening scene sets the stage here for two other moments when "the animal looks at me. " One is drawn from Charles Darwin's notebooks, the other from one of Sigmund Freud's early case studies.
Both of these historical scenes are central to the respective author's version of what constitutes humanity. And like Derrida's meeting with his little cat, these two scenes contain evidence of the gaze called animal, that deeply troubling encounter which seems to be central to that which we call human.
I n J e n n y ' s C a g e , " I t h i n k " One unseasonably warm spring morning at the end of March 1838, Charles Darwin went out for a ride. Th e naturalist had taken to eating two dinners a day while holidaying in Shrewsbury and had grown fat as a result. Regular riding, he wrote to his sister Susan on April 1st, was doing "a wonderful deal of good" (1996, 63) . Not long returned from his famous voyage on the H.M.S.
Beagle, Darwin had just presented his collection of mammal and bird specimens to London's Zoological Society, and on that warm spring morning in (Darwin 1996, 63-64) Darwin would make several more visits to Jenny over the next few months, and being a wealthy and connected Fellow of the Society, was allowed into her cage. Like a typical Victorian suitor, during a September visit he brought her flowers and mints, noting that she "seemed to relish the smell of Verbena & Pocket Handerchief & liked the taste of Peppermint. " He played her music and recorded in his notebook that she listened "with great attention" to his harmonica and "readily put it when guided to her own mouth" (1987, 554) .
He noted her astonished reaction to the mirror in detail. He watched her distractedly pick corn out of her teeth with a straw. He wondered whether she cried.
Few people shared Darwin's fondness for Jenny. Th e sight of this creature so recognizable and yet so diff erent caused much disquiet among visitors to the Zoological Gardens in the late 1830s, the great majority of whom had never seen an ape before.
3 An etched portrait of her graced the cover of the February 3, 1838, edition of the widely read Penny Magazine (Fig. 1 ).
According to the accompanying article, the orangutan wears a "Guernsey in giraff es, curious amazement at a small tortoise). As if guessing the story might provoke anxiety in its readers, the authors close with an emphatic pronouncement: despite the "puerile fancies" among some men of learning about the creature's "affinity to our race . . . we now know that extraordinary as the orangutan may be compared with its fellows of the brute creation, still in nothing does it trench upon the moral or mental provinces of man" (1838, 44).
Darwin would not be so easily dissuaded from his aff ections. Entries about Jenny (as well as Tommy, another ape the Zoological Society acquired shortly thereafter) abound in his notebooks throughout this formative period of his work. Indeed, one might say Jenny served as the scientist's muse.
As is well known, Darwin first developed his ideas about the transmutation of species in a series of lettered notebooks that begin mid-July 1837 and are 
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largely finished by 1840, a period that overlaps directly with his visits to the orangutan. 4 (Jenny died in captivity late in 1839 and was then replaced with another orangutan, also named Jenny.) Th ese notebook entries show Darwin's thought process in terrific detail, revealing his gradually developing questions and ideas about the origin of species. For instance, his famous branching sketch depicting the system of descent between diff erent species of the same class appears midway through notebook B (Fig. 2) . Underneath the firm pronouncement, "I think, " Darwin drew the first phylogenetic tree.
Early in notebook C, after several pages of speculation about the habits, heredity, and adaptations of everything from cuckoos to jaguars to "monsters, "
Darwin pauses to enter an impassioned entry about "man" that deserves to be cited in full:
But man-wonderful man "divino ore versum coelum attentior" is an excep- And yet this famous, life-long public reticence makes these passionate, private notes all the more remarkable, not least because Darwin so quickly and so easily gives over reason, emotion, and language to animals-attributes that were widely believed to belong to humankind alone. As Derrida demonstrates in his Cerisy lecture, the dominant discourse regarding the animal has long been preoccupied with these "powers, " with the animal's "capabilities" compared to what is thought to be "proper to man": having the capability to die, to bury one's dead, to dress, to work, to invent or use a technique, to speak, to possess language or reason. Derrida's furious allegation against the philosophers is that they all say the same thing: "the animal is deprived of language" (2008, 32 (2002) has noted, this layering creates the strange sense that the boy was not so much a patient as an "off ering" to Freud from an early acolyte, a queer variation on the sacrifice of Isaac, in whose place a ram will be substituted at the penultimate moment.
Th e narrative of the case begins when Hans is not quite three years old and displaying a precocious curiosity about his mother's wiwimacher. For Freud, Hans's fear is a parcel of the Oedipal conflict, that complex emotional scene that the Viennese doctor situated at the heart of humanity.
As it plays out here, Hans's desire for mother is blocked by father, whom the child both admires and wishes to replace. At the unconscious level, these feelings are both sexual and murderous. From Hans's desire grow feelings of guilt, a fear of retaliation, and more specifically, a fear of castration. Hans struggles with this emotional conflict: fearful of and yet wishing to love and be loved by his father. In Freud's mind, the horse phobia provides an innovative respite from this tension. Hans's anxiety is both able to find expression and can be managed through a change of signifier. Father is replaced with horse, and the danger situation (i.e., castration) can therefore be avoided by staying away from horses. Hans's phobia provides the means to bind his anxiety, a creative attempt to turn what is felt as uncontained angst into a specific fear by focusing it on a particular object. Anxiety seeks representation. Th e horse is a surrogate, a representation of the vengeful father in a depersonalized form.
But why this particular substitution? Returning to the case years later, Freud describes how the species displacement is made easier by the fact "that at this tender age the traces of totemistic thinking innate in all of us are still easily rekindled. Th e divide between man and beast is still not acknowledged" (2003, 170) . To the child's way of reasoning, man and beast are symbolically equivalent. But why horses? Deborah Britzman suspects the boy was in search of "a private knowledge to contain the force of the loss of the first phantasy"-the unspeakable desire for his mother and fear of his father's castrating revenge (2006, 74) . In Britzman's view, the horse is Hans's personal symbol, a move that signals the inauguration of thinking, a reaching toward symbolic knowledge that will help him tolerate the painful emotions of love and fear. In this respect, the horse might be thought of less as a direct father substitute than as a composite symbol, a means for Hans to represent the complex dynamic felt to exist between himself and his parents, a way for him to begin to represent and think about his chaotic emotional world. And although the horse may be Hans's private symbol, it is not be the last time the creature appears in the psychoanalytic literature. In the last chapter of Th e Apprehension of Beauty, Donald Meltzer describes a love and fear of horses that has gripped him since childhood (though, strikingly, he fails to mention Little Hans). Th e size of the animal, Meltzer insists, has a great deal to do with the child's lack of a sense of reciprocity: "Th e magnitude, the power of the horse mobilizes an infantile component, both of awe and fear" (Meltzer and Williams 1988, 202) . To the child, the parents must seem so large and this inequality so painful.
When Hans is asked to describe the horses he is most afraid of, he singles out those "that have a sort of thing on their mouths. " Hans's father queries further, suspecting the boy is referring to the bit. No, Hans says, "they have something black on their mouths. " Hans's father off ers yet another substitution: "a moustache perhaps?" Hans laughs at his silly father, no, not that:
"Something black" (Freud 2002, 38) . It is precisely at this point that the boy acts out the story of the collapsing horse. Hans's father, still searching for a signified for Hans's signifier, suggests in his letter to Freud that what the boy means by "something black" is the broad leather strap on the muzzles of the dray horses. He even includes a sketch that is reproduced with the published case study (Fig. 3) . But Hans resists anchoring the fearful "thing" to a definitive object. In fact, he resists three times: the horses he fears have a sort of thing on their mouths, something black on their mouths, some thing black.
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Th is thing, this black spot at the edge of the horse's muzzle that escapes every attempt by Hans's father to be pressed into the form of an object, can Th e black "thing" Little Hans identifies on the horse's mouth is perhaps the site of such a stain. In Lacan's terminology, the stain is that which blocks vision rather than off ering itself up as a thing to be seen. It constitutes a disruption, a point of indeterminacy in the visual field where the subject fails to see (c. Copjec 1994) . In this respect, Little Hans off ers us yet another account of how subjectivity depends not only upon how "I look, " but also upon how "I am looked at, " how one can be caught in the field of the other's gaze (Freud 2005) . Th e case illustrates how the child's voyeuristic sexual researches-Hans's precocious pursuit of sexual diff erence-precipitates a sense of wounding anxiety, a sudden realization that one can also be seen, caught in the field of vision.
I imagine this to be the very same disquiet that Jenny caused to her visitors at the London Zoo in 1838. Like Little Hans's horse, she not only represented an object to behold, but a site where one might shudder at the possibility of being seen. Th is is a return of the Oedipal conflict, the resolution of which provides nothing less than the historical and emotional foundations of culture, law, civility, and decency. Here, then, is one way the human descends into the world: in a flood of anxiety that demands to be thought, under the watchful gaze called animal.
I n S e a r c h o f T h i n k i n g "An animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Th inking perhaps begins there" (Derrida 2008, 29) . Coming from a professional philosopher, this state- is given to Adorno's critique of Kant's intolerance of the affinity between man and animality: "Th e Kantian man feels only hate for human animality" (180).
9
Disavowal of the gaze called animal will always be marked by hatred, Derrida seems to suggest, like Ahab's terrible pursuit of the white whale in Melville's grand novel, as if the Captain's rage toward the creature could disencumber his own personality of that which he cannot bear. Such destructive hatred is perhaps always aimed at "the animal" in man, a profound attack upon one's own mind, upon one's very capacity to think and feel.
Had he the time, Derrida might have found another ally in his attempt to "think thinking diff erently" in the form of the British analyst Wilfred Bion.
Bion also borrowed Freud's insights about dream function and placed these at the center of his psychoanalytic theory of thinking. His model is thrillingly counterintuitive:
It is convenient to regard thinking as dependent upon the successful outcome of two main mental developments. Th e first is the development of thoughts. Th ey require an apparatus to cope with them. Th e second development, therefore, is of this apparatus that I shall provisionally call thinking. I
repeat-thinking has to be called into existence to cope with thoughts.
It will be noted that this diff ers from any theory of thought as a product of thinking, in that thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the pressure of thoughts and not the other way around. (1962b, 306) Bion's theory situates thinking as emerging from the capacity to represent emotional experience. Th oughts-which the analyst understands to include sense impressions, perceptions, preconceptions, and concepts-press upon the psyche. Th inking is the activity by which the mind copes with this impressing. It bears emphasizing that in Bion's system, thoughts are treated as epistemologically prior to thinking. When the frustration these impressions generate becomes too great, the development of the apparatus for thinking can be disturbed.
Reminiscent of Darwin's sense of a shared "mental machinery, " here Bion might agree that all sentient organisms must grapple with "thoughts. "
And perhaps "Man-wonderful man" has the machinery for thinking these thoughts "in excess, " but this surplus provides no guarantee that this creature will be able to think. Derrida's rail against the philosophers might be an analogous way of accusing his discipline of being thus disembodied: full of thoughts but without a thinker. Bion actually sounds closer to Darwin's sense of time when he remarks: '"Th inking, ' in the sense of engaging that activity which is concerned with the use of thoughts, is embryonic even in the adult and has yet to be developed fully by the [human] race" (1962a, 85).
10
Th e analyst goes so far as to suggest that speech can sometimes function as an avoidance of thinking. Although talking might potentially be a method of communicating thoughts, Bion suggests it can just as easily be a means to rid one's self of them, an "employment of the musculature," no diff erent than any other bodily action (1962a, 83) . Possession of language does not necessarily lead to thinking.
Where Bion's theory meets Derrida's theme is in their tacit agreement that grappling with emotional experience is at the heart of the labor of thinking. Both are attempting to distinguish between an intellectual ability to manipulate concepts and the emotional capacity to genuinely espouse such concepts. Bion designates these diff erent modes of functioning as K, a thirst for knowledge, and minus K (or -K), a mental state in which experience is stripped of its truth, when knowing becomes an activity that consists of being absorbed with facts, where knowledge is treated as a commodity (1962a).
Th e degree to which an individual can entertain his capacity for thinking depends, to a great extent, on the nature of the learning that occurred at a young age (cf. Waddell 1998) . But at all ages and stages, we inevitably encounter moments and occurrences that confront us with something that is psychically painful. Bion suggests that how one treats the emotional eff ects of these difficult "thoughts"-whether to avoid the pain and frustration they generate or attempt to modify them-will determine the subject's relationship to knowledge, and therefore the capacity for thinking.
Derrida's Cerisy theme off ers a concrete example. Th e philosopher's encounter with his little cat invokes a "reflex of shame, " an intense embarrassment, a terrible "passivity, " a "malaise, " a "madness" which he hastens to escape (2008, 4, 11) . Only when the instant of this "extreme passion" passes is he able to find peace again (12). Only then can he calmly consider the
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beasts, visit them in the zoo, see them in paintings, read about them, speak about them. But in the terrible instant of this passion, Derrida admits to being unable to think. For this moment in his bathroom, he is beset by the same anxiety that chased Little Hans from the street. In Bion's terms, this emotional encounter with the gaze called animal engenders thoughts that urgently call for an apparatus to cope with them. An inability to tolerate the extreme passion-a temptation to take flight from the "malaise"-will obstruct the development of the capacity to think, although paradoxically, a capacity to think would diminish the force of the emotion and allow for the transformation of pain into an appreciation of the gap between a wish and its fulfillment (Bion 1962b, 307) . Th inking does not allow us to avoid the frustration of such encounters, but is rather a kind of operation that seeks to give the emotional experiences of our lives representation through symbol formation, an operation that makes "learning from experience" possible. Derrida's theme-his wonderfully evocative description of his daily "madness"-provides testimony to the lack of unity in the human mind, to the regularity with which anxiety threatens to overthrow one's personality, to the acute difficulty of what it means to try to think, to struggle for a mind of one's own, and to develop a respect for that of others.
Over and over again one finds animal tracks at the site of this profound conflict. As the various historical scenes reanimated here aim to display, animaux, which is heard in the singular, and therefore recalls the extreme diversity of animals that "the animal" erases. And yet when read, animot makes plain that this word (mot), "the animal, " is precisely only a word.
2. To be fair, John Berger inverts his own question at several points in his well-known essay. Pausing over picture books in a window display, for instance, Berger notes that a full third of them picture animals. Th e unstated assumption of such books is that the animals are always the observed, and their bodies have been made visible to us in more and more arresting images: "Th e fact that they can observe us, " Berger bemoans, "has lost all significance" (1991, 16). 6. If the philosophers have largely accepted that the human is not alone in its metaphysical essence (or at least no longer base their arguments on the idea we possess a uniquely transcendent soul), contemporary scientific debate continues about whether nonhuman animals are capable of developing a "theory of mind. "
Among primatologists, theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to recognize the mental states of others. Still marked by the discourse of "capability, " some scientists insist that ToM is uniquely human (Tomasello 1999; Povinelli 2000) . Others present
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evidence of "visual perspective-taking" in apes, which is thought to demonstrate ToM (Shillito et al. 2005; Hirata 2006 might be regarded as exemplars and guardians of this "other thinking" that the philosopher was chasing in his late work, this thinking about the possibility of the impossible, which deserves not to sink down into the night of nothingness.
9. Derrida's sentence perhaps recalls Emmanuel Lévinas's enigmatic remarks about "Bobby, " a dog who greeted the philosopher and his fellow prisoners while they were interned in a Nazi slave labor camp during the war (1990). Bobby's excited greeting-his recognition of the prisoners as men rather than a subhuman "gang of apes"-compels Lévinas to describe the creature as "Th e last Kantian in Nazi Germany" (153) . Th e remark is not without ambivalence. David L. Clark, who parses the fine gradations of the contradictory thoughts and feelings that the animal evokes in Lévinas, suggests that if the thought of "the animal" is in question, so, inevitably, is the thought of "the human" with which it has always been inextricably bound (2004, 44) . In his Cerisy lecture, Derrida is more ruthless in his interrogation of Lévinas's remarks about Bobby (2008, 107-18 
